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I. ANTITRUST IN THE BEGINNING
There is no simple way of dealing directly with the question of
conglomerate mergers without becoming enmeshed, at least to some
degree, in the metaphysical complexities which bear upon the question
of whether a substantial share of the market, when considered alone,
has a desirable or undesirable effect on the economy. Indeed, as illustrated
below, one could have a field day just exploring the peripheral question
of the extent of business concentration in the American economy.
Over the years, students of economics have engaged in polemic
arguments concerning this question. Some have stressed the fact that
concentration was either static, declining, or, regardless of its direction,
traveling at the pace of a "glacial drift."' One study revealed that big
business growth, percentage-wise, merely paralleled the development of
the economy as a whole, and that the number of businesses per thousand
of the population was greater than ever before.2 Moreover, only thirty-six
of the 100 largest companies in 1948 held top-ranking positions of
leadership in 1909; the remaining sixty-four had climbed to such heights
only within the last twenty years.' If this theory is valid, however,
position in the area of concentration might be as tenuous as class or
social status.
The adherents of another school of thought, fortified by a plethora
of private and governmental sources, looked upon a glacier as dangerous
no matter at what speed it was travelling. Others went so far as to declare
that American business had reached the highest degree of economic
concentration in history. If one examined the entire economy, less agri-
cultural production, it appeared that 500 corporations owned two-thirds
* Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, and Associate Director of the Center for
Urban Studies, University of Miami; A.B., Brooklyn College; M.A., Ph.D., Columbia Uni-
versity.
1. Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REv. Ecox. & STATISTICS
295 (1951).
2. A. KAPL.AN, Bio ENTERPRISE 3N A CAPITALISTIC SYSTEM 71-73 (1954).
3. Id. at 141-43.
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of all the productive assets. Professor Adolph Berle, whose statistics
have been quoted above, concluded that "these 500 groupings--each
with its own little dominating pyramid within it-represent a concen-
tration of power over economics which makes the medieval feudal system
look like a Sunday School party."4
During the economic concentration hearings of 1965, it was indicated
that between 1950 and 1962 the share of manufacturing assets held by
the 200 largest corporations had increased from 46.7 percent to 54.6
percent, and the market share of the 100 largest firms had grown from
38.6 percent to 45 percent. Put somewhat more dramatically, the share
of the market held by the 100 largest companies in 1962 was almost
equal to the share held by the 200 largest in 1950.1 Still another classic
statistic relating to the extent of merger activity since 1950 is that
acquisitions by the 200 largest manufacturing companies eliminated
over 2,000 concerns with combined assets of about 17.5 billion dollars.'
The power of the corporation cannot be assessed exclusively in
statistical terms, nor is it the purpose of this writer to become involved
in a hassle with the magicians of the slide-rule. Quantitative measure-
ments too frequently embrace everything but the soul and the spirit. To
fully appreciate the dilemma confronting the political economist in
assessing the role of bigness today, it would seem advisable to examine,
at least briefly, the metamorphosis of the philosophy of the Sherman
Act as it affects or might affect mergers.
The "triumph of American capitalism" was manifested in the last
decades of the 19th Century and the early decades of the 20th Century
by the birth of great mergers of corporations such as Standard Oil, U.S.
Steel, American Tobacco, and International Harvester. One student of
the legislative history of the years immediately preceding the enactment
of the Sherman Act concludes that "there were few who doubted that
the public hated the trusts fervently."' The public insisted upon a remedy
which would destroy the power of the trust before it engulfed everything
in sight. Among the evils for which the trusts were condemned were the
corruption of the administrative agencies, the increase in consumer
prices, the watering of stock, the closing down of plants, the manipulation
of tariffs, and the jeopardizing of employment. The Republican Party,
as the alleged party of the "rich" and the "monopolists," felt an even
greater compulsion than the Democrats to condemn trusts. A banquet
given for the Republican Presidential candidate by a distinguished
group of businessmen which included Messrs. Gould, Vanderbilt, and
4. A. BERLE, JR., EcoNomic POWER AND THE FREE SocriTY 14 (1957).
5. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 518-19 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
6. Id. at 519. Cf. Coulter, The Information Gap in Antitrust Enforcement, 46 NRa.
L. REV. 636-45 (1967).
7. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law, 23 U. CHr. L. Rav. 222 (1956).
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Astor, was described by The New York World as "the Royal Feast of
Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings" during which the "Millionaires
and the Monopolists" pledged their mutual allegiance to the party. It
was a Republican, however, who subsequently initiated the antitrust act
which was to bear his name. Senator John H. Sherman intended the act
to include within its jurisdiction the great industrial trusts, mergers,
tight combinations, and even certain kinds of loose combinations which
tended to prevent full and free competition? Mr. Sherman was echoing
the sentiment of most of his colleagues who believed that the principle
of free competition was so self-evident that there was little need for
extended argument on its behalf.10
Why then, if these strong views persisted, did not Congress enact
a law requiring positive steps toward competition rather than merely
legislating against monopoly? The answer can probably be found in the
customs of the time and, more particularly, in the precedent for using the
common law doctrine of prohibition to combat both restraints of trade
and monopoly. The Sherman Act was viewed not as an attack upon the
system but rather as a purge of its excesses. Thus, the task of the state
was not to impose any artificial set of governing regulations but rather
to make certain that the market mechanism could operate freely. The
impersonal forces of the market place were believed to possess a built-in
morality which automatically would safeguard the best interests of
society. How much the businessman ought to charge the consumer for
a given product and how much he ought to pay his employees were all
matters that could best be answered in terms of his own self-interest. Each
man, by pursuing his own selfish ends, would in reality be working to-
wards a selfless goal of a richer and happier society. One, consequently,
could have his profits and enjoy an easy conscience. Thus, while the
foundations of the laissez-faire government rested upon the individual
choice and the free will of the totality of the numerous buyers and sellers,
it nevertheless bestowed upon the businessman a "dispensation from
responsibility for moral, philosophical, political, and social decisions in
economic affairs."" One could no more become indignant with the laws
of supply and demand than he could with the laws of gravity.
Possibly the amoral quality of a laissez-faire system may have
eased the corporate conscience in its violation of the strictures of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act. A far more activist philosophy arising in defense
of this "devil take the hindmost" approach towards economic growth
and concentration was the gospel of Darwin's doctrine of "survival of
the fittest." When Herbert Spencer applied the general laws of evolution
to the social arena, he provided the philosophical justification for the
8. Id. at 248.
9. H. TORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 185 (1955).
10. Id. at 226.
11. Berle, Jr., Evolving Capitalism and Political Federalism, in FEDERALISM MATURE
AND EMERGENT 74 (A. Macmahon ed. 1955).
1970)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
business tycoons during America's greatest spurt of trusts. Social Dar-
winism was made quite popular among the businessmen and their allies
by the sale of more than 360,000 copies of Mr. Spencer's works between
the 1860's and 1900;12 and this was before the advent of Book of the
Month and other such clubs.
It would have been a strange phenomenon for the most powerful
economic and political entity of the early 1900's to have been condemned
too severely by the courts. One could hardly have expected the Supreme
Court, which had transformed the fourteenth amendment into Herbert
Spencer's Social Statistics, to have been inspired by divine guidance to
interpret the Sherman Act in its purest sense as forbidding every contract
or monopoly in restraint of trade.
Thus, it came as no surprise that the courts created the dichotomy of
good and bad trusts. The mechanism for accomplishing this transition
was the "rule of reason." Mere size in and of itself was not an offense.
The "abuse theory of mergers" viewed as evil only those consolidations
with an overwhelming percentage control of industry which were engaged
in predatory practices or unlawful conduct.'" Somewhere, in the unfolding
of this theory, sight was lost of the evil of all and any kind of monopoly
power exerted or unexerted.
Another less explicit, but still implied meaning of the Sherman Act,
also slighted by the court, was Justice Brandeis' belief that the "curse
of bigness," standing alone, is a menace to society. The courts, in ex-
pounding the rule of reason with its emphasis on intent and practices,
made irrelevant the concept of either market control or monopoly power.
"The distinction between good and bad trusts" as observed by Professor
Milton Handler, "belongs to that outmoded era when the anti-trust laws
were regarded as a moral pronouncement rather than a charter of eco-
nomic freedom."'
4
II. THE NEW SHERMAN ACT
With the advent of the great depression and the mounting evidence
of such big business phenomena as concentration, separation of ownership
and management, price leadership, and the basing point system, the
cultural lag between 19th Century theory and 20th Century practice
became evermore apparent. The "TNEC"'5 hearings and a postdepres-
sion school of scholars challenged the shibboleth of classical competition
12. ROOTS or PoLricIAL BEHAVIOR 318-19 (R. Snyder & H. Wilson eds. 1949).
13. See United States v. International Harvester, 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
14. Adams, Antitrust and Its Critics, 46 NEB. L. REv. 592 (1967) quoting from M.
HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS 78-79
TNEC Monograph No. 38 (1941).
15. TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcONOmic CoMmrrTEE, FNAL REPORT AND RECOMMMENDA-
TioNS, S. Doc. No. 39, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). See also D. LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION
or ECONOmaC Powr (1946).
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in modern society and warned against the dangers that the monopoly
posed to democratic institutions.16 Writer after writer expressed the
fear that the power of business not only competed with that of the state
but threatened to absorb the state. Robert A. Brady, a professor of eco-
nomics, warned that "sovereign power is indivisible, and a house cannot
long remain divided against itself."' 7 Stephen Raushenbush, author,
businessman, and government administrator, believed that the modern
corporation's desire to keep the state weak might beget the seeds for the
growth of Fascism, Nazism, or Communism.18 Charles Beard, the well-
known historian, presaged President Eisenhower's warning against the
growth of the military-industrial complex.' 9
If the advocates of this school of thought feared bigness as a threat
to democracy, they looked for salvation to the "diffusion of power among
the people."20 "Unless 'we the people' can make the industrial system
the instrument of the general welfare, the dominant interests will take
over the government. For the separation of state and economy is now
gone. Y)2
1
A. Unexercised Monopoly Power as a Violation
The United States Supreme Court reflected at least some of these
views in its new interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A new
Sherman Act emerged from the Alcoa case in 1945.22 Acting as a court
of last resort, the Second Circuit Court threw out the abuse theory of
mergers and held that Alcoa did in fact possess a monopoly of the alumi-
num industry in the United States in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act despite the absence of any predatory practices. Judge Learned Hand
wondered how it could be possible for price-fixing arrangements to be
illegal per se, whereas, a single monopoly firm which eliminated all
competition, including that of price, was not. Necessarily, when a mo-
nopoly did fix a price, it would have to fix a price of its own choice for
"the power and its exercise must needs coalesce. ' 28 Thus, the doctrine
postulated in the earlier cases that the existence of unexerted power was
no offense was substantially weakened.
The Alcoa court also dealt with the question of specific intent to
16. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Robert A. Brady, Robert S. Lynd, Stephen Raushenbush
and a number of others share a common set of views that might be characterized as a school
of thought.
17. R. BRADY, BusrNEss As A SYSTEM oF POWER 2 (1943).
18. Raushenbush, The Corporation: An Institutional Factor in Modern History, in
Tx3 CULTURAL APPROACH TO HISTORY 166 (C. Ware ed. 1940).
19. C. BEARD, THE EcooNoc BASIS OF POLITICS 113 (1945).
20. Lynd, Foreword to R. BRADY, supra note 17, at viii.
21. Hamilton, The Smoldering Constitutional Crisis, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1943,
at 76.
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). When
the Supreme Court could not secure a quorum, the case was referred to the Court of
Appeals in the second circuit as the court of last resort.
23. Id. at 428.
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monopolize and held that "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing."24 Judge Hand further opted for competition on
grounds similar to those advocated during the debate over the enactment
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. He went on to say:
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses en-
ergy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry
is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let
well enough alone. Such people believe that competitors, versed
in the craft as no consumer can be, will be quick to detect
opportunities for saving and new shifts in production, and be
eager to profit by them .... True, it might have been thought
adequate to condemn only those monopolies which could not
show that they had exercised the highest possible ingenuity,
had adopted every possible economy, had anticipated every
conceivable improvement, stimulated every possible demand....
Be that as it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it
did not condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it
forbade all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actu-
ated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its
indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small pro-
ducers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and
character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged
must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which
we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we
think the decisions prove to have been in fact its purposes.25
The views enunciated by Judge Hand in the Alcoa case were echoed
by the United States Supreme Court in American Tobacco Company v.
United States.26 In American Tobacco, intent was inferred from the
identity of price behavior, and "neither proof of exertion of the power
to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential com-
petitors12' was necessary to sustain a charge of monopolization under
the Sherman Act. All that was required to prove the crime of monopoliza-
tion under section 2 was "that power exists to raise prices or to exclude
competition when it is desired to do so."' "8 The Court raised the issue of
large advertising expenditures, which was to play such an important role
in later years in cases involving conglomerate mergers. The Court stated:
Such tremendous advertising, however, is also a widely pub-
lished warning that these companies possess and know how to
use a powerful offensive and defensive weapon against new com-
24. Id. at 432.
25. Id. at 427.
26. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
27. Id. at 810.
28. Id. at 811.
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petition. New competition dare not enter such a field, unless it
be well supported by comparable national advertising ....
Prevention of all potential competition is the natural program
for maintaining a monopoly here, rather than any program of
actual exclusion.29
A few years later, in United States v. Griffith,0 the monopolization
issue was further elaborated upon by Mr. Justice Douglas. As in the
previous cases, it was held that specific intent was not necessary to prove
monopoly-it was sufficient that restraint of trade or monopoly was a
consequence of the defendant's conduct. Justice Douglas concluded that
section 2 was aimed at the acquisition or retention of effective market
control and that "monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully ac-
quired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2
even though it remains unexercised.'
Despite these enlightened views of the Sherman Act, court decisions,
until 1962, substantially ignored the concept of oligopoly power. The
frame of reference for the Sherman Act remained monopoly not oligopoly.
As Mr. Joseph F. Brodley observed, "even the vocabulary of anti-trusts
failed. Prices were not fixed but administered. Conditions of scale were
not dictated by monopoly combine but set by a price leader." 2 Mr.
Brodley contends that anti-trust met its greatest defeat because it failed
to cope with oligopoly power.8'
To be sure, there had been some passing reference to oligopoly
power in the "doctrine of parallel action"34 as it was applied to section 1
of the Sherman Act, and also in the "identity of behavior"3" and "concert
of action"3" policies as they were applied to section 2 of the Act. How-
ever, the principle that emerged in the handful of cases referred to above
atrophied through disuse.
B. The New Competition
With the advent of prosperity and affluence in the post World War
II period, the fears of the postdepression school seemed highly imaginary.
Yet, the fact remains that many of the views expressed by this group,
such as the diffusion of power theory, were a fundamental part of Amer-
ican beliefs and mythology. By the 1950's, the time had arrived for a
new school of thought to emerge and attempt to salvage some of the old
basic values and make them compatible with the realities of economic
29. Id. at 797.
30. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
31. Id. at 107.
32. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brodley].
33. Id. at 289.
34. Theatre Ent. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
35. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
36. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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concentration. John K. Galbraith, 7 David E. Lillienthal 8 and Adolph
A. Berle, Jr.,8 9 each of whom might be characterized as a liberal, or, at
least, a realistic liberal (which is not necessarily a contradiction in
terms) brought forth a new theory of competition. Under this new idea,
capitalism was not doomed; it had more vitality than ever. The classical
model of competition with its numerous buyers and sellers had been
abandoned, but in its place had emerged new competing forces as con-
templated by the Schumpeterian dialectic. Thus was born a new theory
of competition based upon substitute products, research, better and more
efficient managerial techniques, public relations consciousness, creative
destruction, and most important of all, the rise of the countervailing
powers. Decisions as to prices, wages, expansion of plant and output
would, like Adam Smith's "invisible hand", now be dependent upon the
competition of economic forces beyond the businessman's control. De-
spite the fact that there was the same apparent inevitability in the
empirically verified growth of countervailing powers, as there was to
be found in the laws of supply and demand, Mr. Galbraith appeared to
be unwilling to place his complete reliance upon the automatic self-
generation of such forces. He added this qualifying thought:
In the light of the difficulty in organizing countervailing powers,
it is not surprising that the assistance of government has re-
peatedly been sought in this task. Without the phenomena itself
being fully recognized, the provision of state assistance to the
development of countervailing power has become a major func-
tion of government-perhaps the major domestic function of
government today.40
There is the additional argument of the new school that it is in the
nature of the modern state that the business manager is himself a plu-
ralistic personality. By this interpretation, he is conceived as being quite
different from his prototype of the past. He is depicted essentially as a
professional man trained in the schools of business administration of
some of our most enlightened colleges and universities. Because his
managerial decisions must be made with an eye to public opinion, he
lives in a political milieu similar to that of a politician and public ad-
ministrator. Consequently, the argument is made that he may rise above
the provincialism of his constituents and see himself as a trustee for
the nation at large. Such an outlook, it is contended, makes him competent
to assess public opinion.
How does one recognize this new deity-"public opinion"-par-
ticularly if it is in that state of metamorphosis where it is still uninformed,
37. J. GAL PAr, Ammiuc.A CAPiTALiSM; Tmz THzoRY op TmH CouNERvAILiNo PowuR
(1952).
38. D. LILENTHAL, Bio BusinEss (1953).
39. A. BERLE, JR., THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIsm REVOLUTION (1953).
40. J. GALBRArrH, supra note 37, at 133.
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inarticulate, and incapable of resisting manipulation in any one of a
number of directions? Professor Berle, who conceived of the "corporate
soul", is not convinced that it can be saved by the ministrations of the
high priests of public relations, who are "commonly more royalist than
the king. .. ."'I The idea of the businessman as a trustee of society is
not new and actually reached a high degree of theoretical development
under the Japanese Zaibatsu, the Nazi industrialist, and the old Rocke-
feller interests in this country. 2 The trustee philosophy advocated for
the managers of the various public and quasi-public corporations is,
of course, not analogous to the private overlord, for the professional
manager does not exist as a power unto himself. The governor, the sec-
retary of agriculture, the president of a union, the pastor of a church,
the superintendent of schools-all represent groups with distinctive in-
terests. All too frequently, however, "behind the fiction of the 'manager
class' so conveniently sterilized from the taint of special interests stands
the same old power. 'The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the
hands of Esau.' ,,43
The equilibrium theorists contend that when an imbalance is cre-
ated in our society, pluralism does provide the equilibrium. This belief
is not merely a reflection of hope that man will act rationally and make
the necessary adjustments to life; rather, it seeks to establish the prin-
ciple of equilibrium as a scientific reflex of living. It apparently must
work. Such a view of trend and countertrend or force and counterforce
is but a libertarian rendition of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. It is
determinism with a broader base than mere class structure.
Behavior follows belief and belief reflects theory, however
vague or profound the comprehension of the theory may be.
Doctrinal shifts filter down slowly from learned journals and




A series of cases emerging after 1950 appeared to accept some of
the implications of the new competition. In this respect, it may be rather
revealing to further examine the ramifications of the Alcoa case. The
"new critics" of antitrust 43 took Judge Hand to task for suggesting that
Congress had not been motivated by economics alone. They argued that
the emphasis on social purpose is generally a smoke screen-a kind of
compensation for a guilt complex-that is used whenever the application
41. Berle, Jr., Business in Government: The New Administration, 8 THE REPORTER 10
(1953).
42. R. BRADY, supra note 17, at 260.
43. R. Lynd, Foreword, supra note 20, at XVI.
44. Lockard, The City Manager, Administrative Theory and Political Power 77 POL.
Sci. Q. 224 (1962).
45. Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLuM. L. Rav. 369-70 (196S); see
rejoinder, Blake & Jones, In Delense of Antitrust, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 377 (1965).
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of the Sherman Act seems to countenance anti-efficiency. To these ob-
servers, the idea that the law prefers the preservation of small businesses
to a free market is of dubious validity as a social policy and impossible
of application as an antitrust doctrine. Coexistence between the social
policy argument and the procompetitive rules can only create a guessing
game which is hardly deserving of being known as a system of law.
An examination of the Alcoa case reveals that Judge Hand's deci-
sion was neither as pure nor as simplistic as his critics avowed. Judge
Hand pointedly observed that, "a single producer may be the survivor
out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight, and industry."46 For these and other reasons which could
automatically or accidentally lead to monopoly, the court believed that
a strong argument could be made that the Sherman Act did not condemn
the result of such forces, even when the public might be exposed to
the evils of monopoly. Furthermore, Judge Hand's dictum, that over
90% market control was a clear monopoly, 64% doubtful, and 33%
clearly not, shows that he was hardly obsessed with the preservation of
small business. Apparently, Judge Hand saw no aberration in the existence
of oligopoly.
Judge John C. Knox, when faced with the problem of applying the
Alcoa case to a much changed postwar economy, pried wider the open-
ing made by Judge Hand and, in doing so, further elaborated upon the
views of the new competition.47 There were certain relevant factors
according to Judge Knox that determined the extent of permissible
power consistent with the antitrust laws: the number and strength of
firms in the market; effective size from a technological and competitive
standpoint; the availability of substitute materials; foreign trade; na-
tional security interests in the maintenance of strong productive facilities;
and maximum scientific research and development. These factors were
to be considered together with the public interest in lower costs and
uninterrupted production. The rationalizations of the court were that
aluminum was a public necessity, that it was in fierce competition with
other products, that bigness was an actuality, that trade rivals must be
of comparable strength, and that companies must be able to compete
with producers of substitute products.4
By 1950, as a result of the actions of the War Assets Administration,
two competing companies, Kaiser and Reynolds, were added to the
aluminum industry. Judge Knox's decree in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America,49 required the shareholders of Alcoa to dispose of their
stock interests either in that company or in Aluminum Limited of Can-
ada, which was controlled by the same nine stockholders as the Alumi-
num Company of America. Grant-back provisions of patent licenses
46. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).





executed by Alcoa with other aluminum companies were declared invalid,
and the court retained jurisdiction for another five years of action against
Alcoa under the Sherman Act, should the need arise for additional relief.
The government's request that the parent company, Alcoa, be di-
vided into two separate but not equal-sized entities, one of which would
become independent of Alcoa, was denied. The court was concerned that
dividing the personnel and equipment would impair Alcoa's research and
management functions and would constitute a singular disservice to the
public. Moreover, the financial benefits received by Kaiser and Reynolds,
through the government's war disposal program, would place a new
company at a decided disadvantage."
In his learned opinion in the United Shoe Machinery case,51 Judge
Charles Wyzansky gave further support to the doctrine that monopoly
was legal if it was "thrust upon" the monopolist. The evidence showed
that United controlled the market and that such control could not be
attributed entirely to such excusable causes as "the result of superior
skill, superior products, natural advantages, technological or economic
efficiency, scientific research, low margins of profit maintained perma-
nently, and, without discrimination, legal licenses, or the like." ' There
were other barriers, however, such as leasing and exclusive long term
contracts which were erected by United's own business policies. Al-
though not illegal in and of themselves, these policies, when applied by
a dominant firm like United, operated to exclude competitors. Thus,
monopoly was acceptable if attained only by economically superior
methods. The decision was affirmed per curiam by the United States
Supreme Court, 3 and a new concept of "good" and "bad" monopolies
had been born with the assistance of midwives Hand, Knox, and Wyzan-
sky.
The courts in dealing with combinations and monopoly still seemed
to be more concerned with alleged economic efficiency than with the
purported purpose of the Sherman Act as a "charter of liberty" con-
cerned with the diffusion of power.
III. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ANTITRUST ACT
AND THE PROHIBITION OF MERGERS
Clair Wilcox succinctly summarized the main differences between
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act
when he observed the following:
The Sherman Act, in its application to combinations, was puni-
tive and corrective. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed
to be preventive. The test of illegality in the Sherman Act was
50. Id. at 417-19.
51. United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
52. Id. at 297.
53. United States Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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strict: it required proof of accomplished monopolization or of
intent to monopolize. The test in the Clayton Act was easier to
meet: it required only a reasonable probability that competi-
tion would be substantially lessened at some future time. Con-
victions should thus have been easier to obtain under the Clayton
than under the Sherman Act. But here, again, judicial interpre-
tation robbed the law of force.54
Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, mergers had
been confined primarily to corporate acquisitions of stock in competing
enterprises. The original section 7 of the Clayton Act provided that
no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire ... the whole
or any part of the stock ... of another corporation ... where
the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or to tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. 55
Ingenious corporation lawyers soon discovered an escape hatch
in the absence in the Act of any prohibition against the acquisition of
the assets of a competing firm. Court decisions contributed to the de-
cline of section 7 by holding that the Commission was powerless to ban
a merger so long as a company used its stock purchases to acquire the
assets before the Commission had acted. 6 The result was that section 7
was rendered impotent and that acquisition of assets became the name
of the game.
To remedy these deficiencies of section 7, to strike down mergers
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act, and to cope with what Congress
believed to be the steadily upward level of concentration brought about
in considerable part by mergers, acquisitions and consolidations, section
7 was amended by the Celler-Kefaufer Act in 1950.57 To be sure, the
transformation of section 7 into a potent weapon for merger control
could not undo the concentration which had already occurred under the
Sherman Act.58 However, "the intent here, as in other parts of the Clay-
ton Act, (was] to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency
and well before they have obtained such effects as would justify a Sher-
man Act proceeding. . ... 59 There was no question but that section 7
was meant to reach far beyond the Sherman Act.
54. C. WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 148 (1966).
55. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914),
as amended 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
56. Arrowhart v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Thatcher Mfg. Co.
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
57. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1950).
58. Asch, Public Merger Policy and the Meaning of Competition, 6 Q. Rav. oF EcoN. &
Bus. 53, 54 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Asch].
59. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 55, at 4-5.
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The Federal Trade Commission in 1948 had warned that in respect
to the national scene the end does not seem to be in sight unless "like
Alexander the Great, the modern monopolist may have to bring his
merger activities to a halt owing simply to the imminent absence of
'New Worlds to Conquer.' ",6o The Commission warned that if nothing
was done to check the growth of concentration, either the giant corpora-
tions would take over the country or government itself would be im-
pelled to resort to direct regulation."' Derek C. Bok and others are
somewhat contemptuous of the faulty conclusions of the 1948 Federal
Trade Commission Report and of the unknowledgeable rhetoric, the
economic naivet6, and the singlemindedness with which the proponents
of the amended section 7 pursued their twin obsessions of concentration
and mergers. Mr. Bok concludes that the "situation was appraised in
the same Jeffersonian egalitarian fashion by almost all who spoke for
the bill."62 The latter observation represents to some economists the
cardinal sin of attempting to analyze profound economic problems in
the simplistic terms of what Schumpeter referred to as "sheer ideology."68
However, Mr. Schumpeter made no pretense that he believed democratic
processes could do anything meaningful about large firms in particular
or business practices in general. To the economic sophisticates, it appears
most unfortunate that the courts cannot cavalierly ignore the intent of
the framers, but for them there is still the saving grace that "this is not
to say that every legislative misconception must be rigorously applied
until it is formally retracted."6 4 One may indeed breathe a sigh of relief
that "legal requirements are prescribed by legislators and courts, not by
economic science. 6 5 To be sure, economic theory does provide the courts
with a tool for analysis but it does not (if this author may be so bold as
to borrow the economic terminology of competition) provide a "work-
able" or "effective" standard of legality, particularly when applied to
future behavior. One should take note of the virtually impossible task
which the court, or for that matter any body of reasonable men, must
encounter when considering in its totality the complex and illusive eco-
nomic data that is relevant in cases involving the effects of mergers. 6
Professor Donald F. Turner, who devastatingly casts doubt upon many
of the economic arguments for the voiding of mergers, nevertheless still
concludes that a Pandora's box would be opened if the outcome of cases
60. FEDERAL TRADE Co5Ia'N, ThE MERGER MOVEMENTS, A SumARY REPORT 22
(1948).
61. Id. at 68.
62. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARv. L. REV. 226, 235 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bok].
63. Mason, Schumpeter on Monopoly and the Large Firm, REV. or ECON. & STATISTICS
139-44 (1951).
64. Bok, supra note 62, at 234.
65. AT''Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM., ANTI-TRUST REPORT 316 (1955).
66. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
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depended upon the review of all the conceivable economic facts.67 These
admonitions hardly reflect anti-intellectual overtones. It would seem to
this observer, that the court is in no position to launch esoteric missiles
into economic outer space if it is to cope with the earthy problems that
confront it in its case by case approach.
In a unanimous decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court interpreted the amended section 7 for the first time.68 In
banning a merger in a fragmented industry which would have given
Brown, a manufacturer as well as a retailer, about 7.2 % of the nation's
retail shoe stores and 2.3% of the nation's total retail shoe outlets, the
Court was concerned with the tendency to establish a precedent which
would further the type of oligopoly that Congress had sought to avoid.
We cannot avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies to-
wards concentration in industry are to be curbed in their incip-
iency, particularly when these tendencies are being accelerated
through giant steps striding across a hundred cities at a time.
In the light of the trends in this industry, we agree ... that this
is an appropriate place at which to call a halt.69
The Court acknowledged that some benefits might accrue to the con-
sumer from the economics of scale resulting from the merger. Brown's
expansion, however, was not illegal merely because the small independent
stores might be adversely affected; it was competition, not competitors,
with which the Act was concerned. Despite this proviso, the Court went
on to add:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of frag-
mented industries and markets. It resolved these competing con-
siderations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to
that decision."°
This decision further distinguished between the activities that tended
toward concentration or oligopoly and those that were promotive of
competition. Thus, it held that Congress had not intended to prevent a
merger of two small companies if this would enable them to more effec-
tively compete with the dominant firms. 1
Still another development in the theory of mergers-a simplified
test to prove illegality-was elaborated upon in United States v. Phila-
67. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.
1318 (1965).
68. 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (J. Stewart and J. Fortas took no part in the case; J. Douglas
concurred) ; Asch, supra note 58, at 56.
69. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346.
70. Id. at 344.
71. Id. at 315-19.
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delphia National Bank. 2 The merger in question would have created
a bank with 30% of the relevant market. As a consequence of this
merger, moreover, four banks would have controlled 78% of the same
relevant market. Under these circumstances, illegality would be pre-
sumed without "elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior
or probable anti-competitive effects.""8 One observer concluded that,
"with the Philadelphia Bank decision, the position of the volumes on
oligopoly theory became secure on the shelves of antitrust lawyers and
the general direction of the development of a legal policy aimed at con-
trolling oligopoly power was established."74 In fact, the Court in the Phila-
delphia Bank case payed homage to the Congressional design to prevent
undue concentration and concluded that mergers resulting in an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market inherently would tend to lessen
competition substantially. Illegality was to be presumed "in the absence
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anti-competitive effects."7
The Court's new position on oligopoly was again manifested in a
case involving the purchase, by Alcoa, of the Rome Cable Corporation.7
Alcoa, a producer of 27.8% of aluminum conductor output, purchased
the Rome Cable Corporation which produced only 1.3%. Rome, which
was but one of four remaining independents in the field, was characterized
by the Court as an aggressive competitor displaying special aptitudes
and skills. Indeed, it was the prototype of the small independents that
Congress aimed to preserve by section 7. According to the Court, the
tendency towards oligopoly in this particular industry with its likelihood
of parallel policies might well be thwarted by the presence of small but
significant competitors."
A case which caused a good deal of consternation was United States
v. Von's Grocery Company7 in which the third largest grocery chain in
Los Angeles sought to merge with the sixth largest. The statistics in the
ten-year period prior to the merger showed that the twenty largest gro-
cery firms had increased their market share from 44% to 57o and that
the share of the market held by the 12 largest firms progressed from
38.8% to 48.8%. 79 What seemed to bother the critics of the majority
opinion was the Court's emphasis on absolute numbers rather than upon
market share. However, despite these shortcomings, there would seem
to be ample justification for the view that "where concentration is gain-
ing momentum in a market [the Supreme Court] must be alert to carry
72. 374 U.S. 321, 362-67 (1963).
73. Id. at 363.
74. Brodley, supra note 32, at 303.
75. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
76. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
77. Id. at 280.
78. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
79. Id. at 290.
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out Congress' intent to protect competition against ever-increasing con-
centration through mergers."80
Despite the differences among scholars over the interpretation of anti-
trust laws as applied to horizontal and vertical mergers, there exists some
consensus in these areas as to mergers which can and should be prohibited
under section 7 of the Clayton Act. This area of agreement, however,
does not extend to conglomerate mergers. Possibly it might be appro-
priate to define these different kinds of mergers since the conglomerates
are sometimes referred to as those mergrs which are neither horizontal
nor vertical. A horizontal merger is one that takes place between two
companies engaged in the same or similar lines of endeavor for the same
geographical market. A vertical merger is the combining of two companies
with a buyer-seller relationship. The remaining mergers which are con-
glomerate have been categorized by the Federal Trade Commission as
market extension mergers, production extension mergers, and others.
Market extension mergers simply refer to the acquisition of a firm doing
the same kind of business in other area markets. Production extension is
the merger of two firms whose products are sufficiently related so as to
allow for the common use of certain management or marketing services.
The "other" category is sometimes designated as a pure conglomerate and
connotes mergers of totally unrelated products, services or facilities."'
Conglomerate mergers, at least for market extension or production
extension purposes, would no doubt take place for many of the same rea-
sons as horizontal and vertical acquisitions. Some of the reasons for
conglomerate mergers briefly summarized are the desire to purchase a firm
in a profitable industry, tax benefits, empire building, greater managerial
challenge, the pooling of financial resources, and the fostering of re-
ciprocal buying."2 In terms of the present epidemic of conglomerates,
however, one would have to agree with those who view the primary moti-
vation as financial rather than competitive. The reason for the popularity
of merger brokering is strikingly explained in the following quotation:
The acquiring company is often seeking to create a reputation as
an acquisition-minded "growth" company. The preliminary ob-
jective is to attract merger partners and to implant in the minds
of the public an expectation of future growth sufficient to cause
the stock of the company to sell at a high multiple of earnings-
perhaps 20 or 30 times earnings, as opposed to a more conserva-
tive 10 times earnings-and the company will thus be enabled to
acquire other firms in stock-for-stock transactions at a favorable
exchange ratio. If all goes well, the process is self-generating; a
company selling at 30 times earnings exchanges a third of its
80. Id. at 277.
81. Hearings, supra note 5, at 515.




stock (plus some increment for incentive) for control of a com-
pany with equal earnings but whose stock sells at only 10 times
earnings. The earnings of the acquiring company are doubled,
but the amount of stock outstanding is increased by only a third.
Thus, earnings per share rise approximately fifty percent in a
single quarter. This large apparent increase in earnings encour-
ages investors to seek the company's stock, which is driven to a
new high and can again be used to make another acquisition at a
favorable exchange ratio. This process does not by its own logic
require that the acquired company be integrated into the acquir-
ing one. Many of the new conglomerates function virtually as
holding companies, with the central corporate headquarters do-
ing little but reviewing quarterly reports from subsidiaries, ar-
ranging financing, and planning new acquisitions. Nor is it neces-
sary that the companies be engaged in related fields. At a recent
seminar on mergers, this author heard the acquisitions director
of a successful conglomerate state, 'If the stock of your com-
pany is selling at twenty times earnings and you can find a
company with steady earnings and competent management and
stock selling at ten times earnings, buy it, regardless of what kind
of business it is in.'88
There are those who feel it is an absurdity to attack a true con-
glomerate merger "in order to maintain competition, because it has no
effect on any market structure.""4 Another somewhat less skeptical ob-
server, although doubting that recent conglomerate mergers raise any
particular anti-trust problems, nevertheless expresses the view that a
day of reckoning may come when the conglomerates will seek to integrate
operations. "This probability is the reason why anti-trust is not really
rendered irrelevant by the fact that a company buys other firms without
regard to competitive consequences and initially operates them as autono-
mous subsidiaries.1
85
Professor John M. Blair has accused a number of eminent legal
authorities of attempting deliberately to exclude conglomerates from
the sanctions of section 7. According to him, this attitude may be ex-
plained by their refusal (1) to utilize the tendency-toward-monopoly test,
(2) to take into account the theories of anticipatory reaction with its em-
phasis on psychological response, (3) to believe that the Court may not
take into consideration the economies of scale in applying the law, and
last, and most important from the view of a political scientist, (4) to
understand that Congress was concerned not only with "the maintenance
of competition, but also the preservation of certain social and political
83. Davidow, Conglomerate Concentrations and Section Seven: The Limitations of the
Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Davidow].
84. Adelman, The Anti-Merger Act, 1950-1960, 51 Am. EcoN. REV., PAPERS & PRO-
cEEDiNcS 243 (1961).
85. Davidow, supra note 83, at 1239.
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values to which Congress, rightly or wrongly, attached great impor-
tance."86
An examination of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding con-
glomerate mergers will provide a basis for determining the judicial re-
sponse to the four major issues enunciated by Professor Blair. This
analysis for purposes of convenience will classify a number of basic cases
involving conglomerates into two major categories: A) potential compe-
tition, and B) the leverage power of the conglomerate.
A. Potential Competition
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company,87 no actual com-
petition existed between El Paso, the sole out-of-state natural gas supplier
to the California market, and Pacific Northwest, which had failed to pene-
trate the California market. Yet, Pacific Northwest, despite its unsuccess-
ful efforts to enter the California market, had been able to force El Paso
to lower its prices. In responding to the contention that there was no actual
competition between the two companies, the Court noted:
We would have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts
of Pacific Northwest to get into the California market, though
unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's business atti-
tudes within the state. We repeat that one purpose of § 7 was "to
arrest the trend toward concentration, the tendency to monopoly,
before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through mer-
ger. .... ))88
In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company,89 Pennsalt and
Olin Mathieson, while maintaining their separate identities, created a new
entity Penn-Olin Chemical Company, for the purpose of producing and
selling sodium chlorate in the southeastern part of the United States. Each
company had evidenced interest in independently entering the chlorate
field before the formation of the joint venture. The Supreme Court held
that the district court had erred in failing to consider the probabilities that
either of the parents "might have remained at the edge of the market,
continually threatening to enter."9 In an oligopolistic market, "the exis-
tence of an aggressive, well equipped and Well financed corporation en-
gaged in the same or related lines of commerce... would be a substantial
incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated."'" The district
court was reminded that the mandate of Congress was to be considered
86. Blair, Conglomerate Mergers: Theories of the Case and Congressional Intent, in
SY'MPOSIUM ON CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AT THE U. OF CALIF. 2 (1961).
87. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
88. Id. at 659.
89. 378 U.S. 158 (1964); the case, upon being remanded to the District Court, was
dismissed on the grounds that it was not probable that either of the parent companies
would have entered the field independently. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246
F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd, 399 U.S. 308 (1967) (4:4 decision).
90. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964).
91. Id. at 174.
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"in terms of the probability of a lessening of substantial competition, not
in terms of tangible present restraints." 2
Continental Can Company v. United States93 dealt with the issue of
inter product competition, and concerned a merger between a producer of
metal cans and a producer of glass containers. Neither of the producers
had ever been competitors and each was generally producing containers
for exclusively different purposes. Critics may hold that the market defini-
tion in this case was somewhat exaggerated. However, the new school of
economics has consistently taught that substitute products are a form of
new competition. If this be the case, then one would have to concur with
the Court's view that it would make little sense to expect the glass and
metal entities within the Continental empire to compete for the same end
use. The Court once again affirmed that a merger in which the acquiring
firm is a "dominant firm in a line of commerce in which market power
is already concentrated among a few firms" is inherently suspect, and
elaborate proof of market structure and behavior and probable anti-
competitive effects could be dispensed with.94
B. Leverage Power
United States v. Procter & Gamble Company95 involved a product
extension merger in which Procter, with 54% of the detergent market,
absorbed Clorox with nearly half of the household bleach market. Procter
is one of the nation's 50 largest firms. The question was whether a con-
glomerate had a peculiar kind of power resulting from the diversity of its
own product area which would rub off on its new conquests. The high-
lights of the Court's decision are as follows: first, the Court reiterated
that all mergers are within the reach of section 7 and that all must be
tested by the same standard whether they be horizontal, vertical, conglom-
erate, or other; 96 second, possible economies cannot be used as a defense
for mergers which lessen competition; 97 third, there was every reason to
assume that smaller firms would be dissuaded from aggressively compet-
ing;98 fourth, the entrance of Procter would make oligopoly more rigid,
and Procter probably would become the price leader;" fifth, the advertis-
ing discounts available to Procter constituted a major competitive weapon
in the marketing of bleach and would have a tendency to raise the barriers
to new entries;1"' and, sixth, that the merger eliminated Procter as a
potential competitor.' 0'
92. Id. at 177.
93. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
94. Id. at 458, 464.
95. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
96. Id. at 577.
97. Id. at 580.
98. Id. at 578.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 579.
101. Id. at 580-81.
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Another significant case involving a similar kind of a merger was
Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods.10 ' Consolidated, which
owned food processing plants together with a network of wholesale and
retail stores, acquired Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer principally of dehy-
drated onion and garlic. The Federal Trade Commission held that the
acquisition gave Consolidated "the advantage of a mixed threat and lure
of reciprocal buying in its competition for business," and the "power to
foreclose competition from a substantial share of the markets for dehy-
drated onion and garlic.'
03
These latter decisions (Continental and Procter), dealing with the
more readily recognized conglomerates, taken in conjunction with the
precedent set by earlier cases involving potential competition, have erased
a good deal of the mystery from the law pertaining to conglomerates. In
both Procter & Gamble and General Foods, it was the "power" of the
conglomerates to intimidate, to discourage, and to dissuade that the Court
frowned upon. Power was evil in some instances because of the psycho-
logical effect it might have upon existing or new entries and, in others,
because of the strengthening of oligopoly, and, in still others, because of
advantages that resulted from certain of the economies of scale.
Some economists are concerned with the differences between "real"
economies of scale and those economies that are the products of leverage
emerging purely from the economic power of the conglomerate. The politi-
cal scientist hardly reflects this bias. Congress disowned all power which
substantially lessened competition or threatened substantially to lessen
potential competition or to create a tendency toward monopoly.
Moreover, the mere existence of this ... power might make its
conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the posses-
sion of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated busi-
nessmen are quick to see the advantages in securing the goodwill
of the possessor.
0 4
IV. THE 1960'S: THE BIRTH OF A NEW REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT
As the 1890's were the heydays of the trust, so this decade is
rapidly emerging as the golden age of the conglomerates. The
Oil Trusts, the Sugar Trusts and the Tobacco Trusts are only
memories, but Ling Temco Vought, Gulf & Western Industries
and International Telephone and Telegraph are today amassing
corporate empires with such verve and voraciousness that one
suspects the age of the moguls is not past. °5
A comparison of the growth of conglomerate mergers between the
periods 1951-54 and 1963-66 provides ample evidence to support the above
102. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
103. Id. at 593.
104. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
105. Davidow, supra note 83, at 1231.
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quotation. In terms of the large mergers, those involving acquisitions of
$10 million or more in assets, conglomerates accounted for 51%o in the
1951-54 period and 71%o in the more recent period. Numerically, conglom-
erate mergers have increased more than 600%o. Dollarwise, the earlier
mergers involved some $1.3 billion as compared to over $10 billion in
1963-66.
More recent data showed that by 1967, conglomerates had increased
to 83%o of the total of large mergers and 80%o of the assets of such
mergers."0 6 Conglomerate growth, which today has reached significant pro-
portions, may have been stimulated until recently by a deliberate policy
of the government to concentrate primarily upon horizontal and vertical
mergers. The conglomerate, at this moment, is a kind of last frontier for
the growth of industrial empires. Thus, a strong case may be made for
reversing Professor Turner's relative hierarchy of rules for mergers by
pressing hardest on conglomerate mergers.
Senator Phillip A. Hart would concur with this conclusion. He is
convinced that it is power not efficiency that is the driving force of the
giant corporation. He believes the reasons for such mergers to be more
understandable to the accountant or the investment banker than to the
lawyer or the engineer. Computers, innovative industrial technologies, and
low capital requirement products signify to the Senator the beginning of
a new industrial revolution-a revolution which is more advantageous to
the small rather than to the giant corporation. He is convinced that
small and medium size firms have demonstrated far greater industrial
ingenuity and inventiveness than the large industrial complex. °7
There is in the nature of democratic authority a kind of evolution
from unilateral or monolithic to polycentric. The existence of multiple
avenues of access-legislative, judicial, executive, and administrative-in
the same sphere of government, allows the citizen to indulge in a kind
of comparative policy shopping. The desire to disperse authority was ex-
pressed by the founding fathers in their advocacy of the principle of
separation of powers. In a similar manner, the pluralistic nature of our
society provides alternative routes to policy making through different
spheres of public government-national, state, local, and county, and
through varying countervailing forces of private government such as
industry, labor, and agriculture. It is the multiplicity of these access areas
that is of vital importance to the open society.
President Lyndon B. Johnson's Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 08
chaired by Phil C. Neal, believed that the preservation of a large number
and variety of decision-making units in the economy is important to
ensure innovation, experimentation, and continuous adaptation to new
106. FTC Press Release No. 1-2 (Mar. 18, 1968).
107. Hart, The New Industrial Revolution, 25 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 187-92 (1968).
108. Presidential Task Force on Antitrust Policy, Report, TRADE REG. REP. (Supple-
ment No. 415, May 26, 1969).
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conditions. Moreover, antitrust policy is viewed as reflecting a direct
preference for private decision-making, which consequently minimizes the
need for government intervention in the operation of business.
This observer would concur with the views of the many scholars who
are skeptical of the role of government as a regulator. Certainly the his-
tory of government regulations, as exemplified by agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission and state public utility commissions,
all too frequently reveal that the agency's viability is dependent on its
subservience to the very clientele it is intended to regulate. Critics of
antitrust are far too eager to recommend that resort be to regulation
rather than promotion of the competitive market structure. The Johnson
Task Force, however, showed no such compunctions and recommended
that the antitrust laws be amended to provide for a specific legislative
remedy directed to bring about a reduction in oligopolies or highly con-
centrated industries through divestiture, if necessary. Absent such direct
action, there was little likelihood of any significant decline in concentra-
tion. The Task Force believed that it was not advocating any new policy
but was simply reinforcing the existing public philosophy toward concen-
tration. The recommended legislation would aim where feasible to reduce a
four-firm concentration ratio of aggregate market share to below 50' and
the market share of the individual firm to below 12 %.
In keeping with this spirit, the Task Force would also provide specific
prohibitions of certain kinds of conglomerate mergers. Merger guidelines
established in 1967 by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, while
quite restrictive of horizontal and vertical mergers, were far more tolerant
of conglomerate mergers. The Task Force proposal, on the other hand,
would prevent conglomerate mergers between very large firms and other
large firms that were already leading firms in significant concentrated
markets in the national economy. The prohibition of such mergers would
no longer rely on "conjectural judgments" and would lessen reliance on
"extended and contrived interpretations of section 7." Instead, the em-
phasis of these proposals would be to improve the competitive structure
of American Industry.
The Nixon Task Force on Productivity and Competition, chaired by
George J. Stigler,"°9 did not share the philosophy of the Johnson group
and seriously doubted that the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice "should embark upon an active program of challenging conglomer-
ate enterprises on the basis of nebulous fears of size and economic power."
Instead, the Nixon Task Force proposed that a conference be called so as
"to identify the problems, if any, created by the large conglomerate enter-
prise." A similar position was taken by the Task Force concerning pro-
posals to deconcentrate highly concentrated industries by dissolving their
leading firms. Here, too, the rationale was the inadequacy of present
109. President's Task Force on Productivity and Competition, Report, 413 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. X-1-7 (1969).
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knowledge as to the effects of oligopoly on competition. Antitrust appar-
ently was to be viewed only from the vantage point of "good economic
sense", and the Task Force cautioned against the temptation to utilize
the antitrust laws to combat social problems not related to the competitive
functioning of the markets.
The Stigler report perpetuated the myth that antitrust laws are con-
cerned only with the economics of the marketplace and opts for a pre-
ferred or Platonic position for the economist-advisor, free from the dis-
tractions plaguing social and political analysts. Unfortunately for the
Nixon Task Force, the economic, political, and social objectives of the
antitrust laws are part and parcel of the same fundamental philosophy of
a democratic society based upon diffusion of power. Attorney General
John M. Mitchell recognized this interrelatedness when he stated, "[w]e
have constructed a complex economic structure which successfully reflects
adherence to the political and social principles of our free society."'10
Because of the dangers posed by the economic concentration of conglom-
erate mergers to the vitality of a free economy and the aspirations for
a free society, Mr. Nixon's Attorney General, contrary to the recommen-
dations of the Nixon Task Force, promised to strengthen the antimerger
guidelines. He warned that the Department of Justice might oppose any
merger among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable
size in other industries.
Mr. Mitchell's fear that superconcentration lea," -", control of the
nation's manufacturing and financing resources in th, ids of fewer and
fewer persons is hardly a novel and quixotic concept but is nevertheless
reflective of a new revolutionary spirit which is sweeping the land. Stu-
dents, blacks, and others among the alienated and disillusioned are clamor-
ing for the right to participate in decisions affecting their basic existence.
Perhaps, the emphasis upon what has come to be known as participatory
democracy is an outgrowth of the affluent society with its rising expecta-
tions. The depression psychology of the Thirties led to disenchantment
with the uncertainties of the market place. Security replaced competition
in the affections of business, agriculture, and labor. The obsession with
security fathered the myth of the inevitability of concentration, and the
belief persisted that one could not exist without the other. The revolution
of the Seventies challenges this concept, and, more strongly than ever,
demands the dispersal of power, particularly in the private sphere. The
philosophy of the antitrust "is founded on a theory of hostility to the
concentration in private hands of power so great that only a government
of the people should have it.""' To this observer, the modern conglomer-
ate qualifies as that kind of private power concentrate, and the Supreme
Court, in applying section 7 to conglomerates, has interpreted the Act
"in the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at which
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the legislation was aimed.""' 2 Further recognition of the need for more
intensive control of conglomerates has recently taken several forms: a
strengthening of the relevant tax laws"' and more restrictive requirements
by a number of administrative agencies." 4 However, the times may re-
quire a still further expansion of the antitrust law, to strengthen the posi-
tion of the courts in the field of antitrust, and to reaffirm the nation's
basic belief in the diffusion of power in both the political and economic
spheres.
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